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Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1914
The place of evil in a moral system
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/17378
Boston University
THE PLACE OP EVIL ITT A MORAL SYSTEM
CHARLES SCHTJTTLER.
This is
B-W Cover No. 917C
Fillers to Fit
No. 819 F Ledger Bond Unruled
No. 820 F Manilla Ruled
No. 834 F Unruled
No 835 F Faint Ruled
No. 836 F Faint With Marginal Ruled
No. 837 F Quadrille Ruled
No. 838 F Cross Section Ruled
No. 839 F White Drawing
No. 840 F Faint With 2 Marginals
THE PLACE OE EVIL ITT A MORAL SYSTEM
By
CHARLES SCHU7TLEE
( A. B. , Central Yesleyan , 1204 ; 3. T.B.Boston, 1910)
A Diasertation
aubmlttel In partial fulfilment of the
requirement 3 for the
'isgree of Doitor of Philosophy
GRADUATE SCHOOL
1914

I'ph 33
5
ANALYSIS.
Introduction:—By a moral system is here meant the whole or-
der of human life. It presupposes, first , an ideal of conduct, and
second, freedom to strive after this ideal.
A moral system is taken for granted. This standpoint i & in
agreement with optimistic philosophy and the convictions of the
race. Thus we are supported in our presupposition hy both faith
and reason.
Chapter4 I:-Our viewpoint is not incongruous with a moral
purpose. Were finite evil wills eternal and independent, a moral
system would be impossible. We must not suppose that moral ex-
cludes the possibility of evil. Good presupposes freedom of choice.
Hence , theoretically at least, we must admit the possibility of
moral lapse in finite beings. Yet the system, that embraces such
a possibility , can be perfect, as a system.
Our system ,then, i s moral, not in the sense of absolute, be-
cause it has In it a place for evil; it 1 3 not imperfect as a
system, because the evil in it is neither independent nor deter-
mined.
Chapter II: -The Nature of Evil. Evil is of three kinds: phy-
sical, moral and metaphysical. These three forms must not be con-
fused. Physical and moral evil can become intelligible only when
properly distinguished from the metaphysical aspect of evil.
Leibnitz explains the source of evil as metaphysical imper-
fection. Sin is privation. Julius Mueller objects to this view on
the grouhd that it will not explain positive acts of the will, He
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further asks: "Does it agree with our experienceTPoes it harmo-
nize 'with conscience or with the feeling of abhorrence with which
evil fills us?”
So far as moral evil i3 concerned, Mueller is no doubt right.
Metaphysically, however, Leibnita may have been right in calling
evil negative.
Chapter III. Physical Evil: -The right to inquire into this
problem cannot be denied us. In our day of scientific investiga-
tion we no longer stand in awe of natural forces*, yet the problem
of natural evil continues to baffle us. The socalled irrationali-
ties of nature appear to the mind as disorders.
This is no proof that a partial solution is impossible .Con-
templation of the problem will tend to dissipate absurdities.
physical
In one sense we might consider as -tutor
a
d: evil that which we
try to shun,- anything dietasteful, irksome, dreaded. The criterion
by which to judge would then be our personal feeling. In another
sense, we might consi der as evil what out better judgment tells us
will ultimately work destruction. Thus, physical evil is that which
appears both absurd and di agreeable, in the light of most extended
knowledge.
Yet, before we can pas3 final judgment as to the good or evil
of any given case, it is necessary to know the whole plan that em-
braces it. Our limited knowledge will not enable us to know all
that may be implied or involved;so that, perhaps af&er all, physi-
cal evil would be such only in appearance.
.IE 1^1 11 '
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Wrong views on naturalism interfere with a successful considera-
tion of tills problem. The natural world is often thought of as
wholly independent of God. Plato regarded the world as an imper-
fect realization of a divine idea. Comte argued that the problem
of physical evil made it necessary to limit either God’ 3 power
or his goodness. Mill held somewhat similar views.
Leibnitz explained physical evil as necessary imperfection
of all created. Yet Leibnitz believes that good always outweighs
evil. He further maintains that it makes for good.
Lotze objects to evil as a means of good.He sees no virtue
in suffering as a warning, because this does not explain why the
evil of which we are warned is necessary. He prefers to make physi
cal evil flow from'Abral evil.
We naturally wonder then, why the innocent suffer. Evidently
disobedience cannot be the only cause of physical evil.
Hoyee explains evil by philosophical idealism. Evil is a de-
fective expression of a good order. Suffering is a temporal reali-
ty. Without it, life would be imperfect .Hoyee also believes that
there is a ’’soul of goodness in things evil”;for the presence
of evil makes room for a conscious struggle whereby the soul
seeks its completion in the eternal order.
Eiske also believes that everything is a fragment of the
dramatic whole.
A study of causality will show that God i 3 indeed in all
things. Objects of disorder in the natural world may be only ne-

cessary steps in the working out of a greater plan. Physical evil
may be in perfect harmony with the plan of the Eternal.
Chapter IV , Moral Evil: -A partial definition of moral evil
may be expressed as followsia conscious transgression of the mo-
ral law, a conscious choosing of the worse in presence of the bet-
ter, a conscious ioiiy of something less than the best. A complete
definition must throw some light on the attitude of the individu-
al toward his deeds. Sin. then, is that which our moral sense and
an enlightened conscience tells us ought not to be.
The manner, in which the moral faculties of man may have been
developed, is a matter of indifference; we know that the moral-ra-
tional nature of man is a fact.
Piske attributes the power of judging moral truths to the
evolution of ideals. His view is largely raechaM cal. Spiritual fac-
ulties are a development of nature which automatically expresses
itself.
Mechanical developments will not account for the conscious
life; for conscious life is a new fact,a new power, which somehow
has been added to the organism.
The same objection obtains against the spontaneous develop-
ment of our moral nature. This too, must be referred to a free -e
causal act of an infinite personal will.
Our standards of judging right and wrong may change, but a
deed is right or wrong for us according to the light and the mo-
ral sense we pos3e33.AH relative conduct would appear immoral
..
.
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to a perfect moral consciousness.
The purpose to he righteous and to he pure is the hest cri-
terion hy which to judge the moral life of finite individuals.
Moral evil is the conscious purpose to he less than our highest
ideal represents to us.
Leihnitz makes moral evil, as well as all other evil,negative.
The world is the hest possible,he claims, since the permission of
evil was necessary for the good of the whole. The negative element,
which i3 sin, comes from the finite agents.
Mueller believes that evil is an operative principle, a wil-
ful turning away from God. The motive is selfishness.
Spinozats conception of evil is intellectualistic .Sin is a
concept of imperfection.
Martineau makes sin a personal matter.
With Kant, moral evil is only phenomenal.
According to Boyce, all evil is in God.Bven the ill will of
the individual i3 included in the absolute. Boyce distinguishes,
however , between the temporal and the eternal order. Gin i3 a con-
scious forgetting, which results from a conscious narrowing of the
field of attention.
Bechner thinks of evil as something more realistic.lt is es-
sential to progress , because it furnishes an occasion for efforts
to remove it.Bechner here ignores the distinction between imper-
fection of nature and positive evil will.
We come to the following conclusions concerning moral evil:-
Birst, moral evil must be free. Determined moral evil is a con-
tradiction. There can be no responsibility without freedom.
? ' f
—
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Second, moral evil must be positive. Even 3ins of omission
are positive when truth is consciously ignored.
Third, moral evil is,in a sense, relative*Moral individuals
have an ideal of perfection which carries them beyond their pre-
sent attainments.
Fourth, moral good is not dependent upon moral evil. It i3
possible for the goodwill to exercise its power of volition with-
out the opposing evil will*
Fifth, imperfection may in a measure become the occasion of
moral attainment , because present failures spur to a conscious
striving after something better.
Chapter V,Qfhe Metaphysical Aspect of Evil: -If we make God
the final cause of all things in the universe , evil must be ac-
counted for in some satisfactory way without contradicting our
original presupposition of a moral system. God cannot be held
directly responsible for all evil in the world.lt involves a con-
tradiction to suppose that the ill will of the individual can be
determined. Yet by the cultivation of habit, man may come to the
place where he spontaneously meets the demands of a moral law.
From the fact that freedom was necessary to make deeds eitheT
morally good or morally evil, it does not follow that the evil
will was itself necessary. Leibnitz evaded the difficulties aris-
ing from a necessary evil will by making only the good real.
It is consistent to hold,that God could have dispensed with
the evil will of the individual ; for man is not compelled to will

evil before he is able to will the good. In short
,
positive evil
i 3 not an essential factor in producing good.
The metaphysical nature of evil is better understood when
t
we distinguish between abstract sin and sinful deeds. The idea of
an abstract evil principle i3 based on crude thought . Actual sin
mu3t be individual.
It follows then that the individual must have been endowed
with the po ver to exercise his will. Yet we cannot make God the
direct author of. the evil will. Though God made man free and gave
him power to act, he did not determine what should be the nature
of his acts.
Whatever may be possible logically, w§ know from experience
that man, blessed with freedom and endowed with power, often
does sin.
Chapter ITT . The Origin of Evil: -The source of ill will can-
not be in an eternal, independent principle .Duali sm is equally im-
possible. TTor can the ill will be the product of divine causality,
for we cannot account for the incongruity of such a creative
act. Nor could the individual be free and moral, if his evil
will were determined.
It follows then ,that evil must either have arisen of it-
beginning
3elf,or it had it3 uofrryvln free volitional act3 of finite
inlividuals.lt coull not have arisen of itself, for spontaneity
explains nothing. Its 30urce must be sought in man.
But how came man to voluntary 3in?The Genesis story takes
us back/only to the tempter, but does not attempt to explain the
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evil will of the tempter. The Manichaean system lands us in
dualism
.
Comte and Mill attributed evil to the limitation of God’s
power. Kant seeks the source in man’s sensuous nature .Others
tell u 3 that the evil will had it3 origin in man’s extra-tem-
poral acts of self-deci3i on. However, Leibnitz , the defender of
this view, places the extra-temporal existence only in the di-
vine understanding, the source of essence, not in the divine
will, the source of existence.
It brings us no nearer to the solution of our problem to
place the origin of evil in the soul’s pre-existence , or in an
act of humanity.
The origin of evil must be sought in free finite persons,
freedom is necessary because acts would have no moral signif-
icance without it.Finitude is necessary , because free volition-
al evil would not be apt to occur under any other conditions.
Though finite persons have onl Tr limited power, it is neverthe-
less the power of self-direction.
finite persons pos3es3 not only limited power, but limited
knowledge as well. Sin originates and thrives best in ignorance.
Yet 3in is essentially different from error. With the awakening
of moral consciousness, materially bad conduct becomes sinful 5 for
a consciousness of moral relations places on man a moral re-
sponsibili ty.
Thus man is permitted to sin, because he has libertyjhe

is able to sin, because lie possesses personal powerjman ices 3in^
because he is finite.
Man’s knowledge and moral sense grew by 3low degrees, yet he
gradually attain $ the capacity to comprehend truth. But as this
development goes on, man does not always desist from evil.
Chapter VII, The Propogation of Evils-After the evil will 0-
riginates
;
it is supported by the influence of positive acts of
the will. The influence of sinful lives all about us is felt. In
our own lives sinful tendencies, cultivated by habit, makes us
willing to be less than the best. The force of habit also makes
it easy for evil tendencies to grow; so that., even after and indi-
vidual becomes aware of the sinfulness of his deeds, he still per-
sists in doing them.
Bin i3 propagated in the social realm, by the dynamic force
of an evil will, influencing other wills. This propagation is fur-
thered by the tendency in the lives of individuals to imitate.
The urging of evil minded persons, the allurements of sinful act3,~
all tend to weaken the power of resistance .Sin does not propagate
itself per sejit spreads through the influence of positive evil
wills and evil deeds.
Conclu8ion:-In a relative world it is quite natural that we
should have sin. We may ask ourselves , why this relativity? Was
imperfection necessary? If we could become truly moral beings on-
ly through choice and by conscious striving, it was necessary that
we shouli be in a condition where striving is possible. Such a
condition is conceivable only for free finite beings.
'If
.
.
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* Yet finite individuals are not compelled to strive in vain.
They may always blunder .in darkness; but logically, there is no
absolute necessity of their positive ill will. They might follow
the inner light, strive after their highest ideals, and thus become
morally perfect.

THE PLACE OH EVIL ITT A MORAL SYSTEM.
Introduction
.
By a Moral system is here meant the whole order of human
life with all its relations and implications concerning con-
duct and ethical attributes . This presupposes two things: first
,
that there is an ideal of conduct and perfection for man to
aim at ; second, that rnar\ is free to pursue this ileal, or not
to pursue It, as his will determines . The second presupposition
also implies that, in order to be moral, man must have some
knowledge of right and wrong,and coupled with it, a sense of
duty or desire to do the right.
Ho attempt is made to prove that there is a moral system.
That is taken for granted.lt might be profitable to study con-
ditions, to note the tendency of growth and development , to an-
alyze our inner motives and dispositions, with a view of de-
termining to what extent moral forces are at work in and about
us. This, however, would only lead to the subject under considera-
tion. It seem3 best ,therefore , to accept the teaching of opti-
mistic philosophy on this point, to trust the deep and wide-
spread conviction of the race and the longing of our inner na-
ture, by admitting that the system of which we are a part, can
not be otherwise than moral.
By presupposing a moral system, the attempt is not to e-
vade a difficul ty.We take this position because we are deal-

ing neither with scepticism nor with pessimism. The question
of a moral order of humanity has been dealt with more or less
directly by the best philosophers of the past decades .Never
before has philosophy been so illuminated by a theistic and
optimistic teniency.
Furthermore, we feel justified in taking this position
because the whole tendency of the human race is optimistic.
Optimists believe in a moral system. The world has always be-
lieved in it. It is true, there have always been a few pessi-
mists, but the tendency of the race has never been in that
directi on. The few individual pessimists are like jarring notes
of dicord injk great composition; they offend the moral sense,
but do not destroy our faith in the deeper harmony of things.
Pessimism is obnoxious to the very nature of man.
From the consideration above, it appears that in many in-
stances faith has been as strong in the support of optimism
as has reason.lt must be borne in mind, however, that there is
nothing in optimism contrary to reason. In fact, no other view
is 30 free from rational objections .Optimism preserves the
unity of the system, which unity is necessary to remove all
rational contradictions . Should we admit with some pessimists
that all being is evil, that man is without the sense of moral
responsibility, and unable to aspire to truer things, two in-
soluble difficulties would at once present themselves .In the
first place, we should then have no way of accounting for

3whatever good the great majority of our fellowmen 3eem to
possess and be aware of. The best we could do would be to insist
that they are deceiving themselves . Secondly, we should have to
prove that evil does not destroy itself, as our experience
teaches us it does. Should we modify our premise and say that
being is not all evil,but that, though good exists, evil is co-
existent with it, a still more perplexing problem would arise.
Dualism with all its contradictions would stand in our way.
TCe should be subjected to the unprofitable task of trying to
remove the maxing that a house divided against itself can not
stand.
The assumption that the fcoral sense in man is only a de-
velopment of utilitarianism, does not affect the moral charac-
ter of the system. Granted, that , so far as the history of the
race is concerned , man ’ s conception of the good and his moral
sense were developed by shrewdly choosing what was for his own
personal good, it does not follow from this, that his moral na-
ture now is essentially different from what it would have
been
/
had it come into existence any other way. The verdict,
that Wan’s code of conduct is variable, that his notion of
moral right changes with increased knowledge and a growing sense
of right and wrong, does not prove that man is necessarily un-
moral, or wholly immoral. ior does this prove that there is no
immutable, perfect moral law in the Hivine Mind; it only shows
that man in his relative state , comprehends this ideal only in

part. In God’s mind, the law Is perfect and invariable; in man’s
life, it is realized imperfectly. Yet we become aware of its
presence. Were It not for the fact, that we have some knowledge
of the unfol ling of this valid co le or rule in the lives of
human beings, we could not know that the changes in moral no-
tions or actions, to which we give the name progress, are proper-
ly so-called. We walk in partial darkness, yet we are guided by
a great light far ahead.lt does not matter how we are able to
see that light, or how the power of sight originated; it is a
question of how it now manifests itself in the lives of men.
For God, having in mind a moral purpose, could work out his
plan by one method a3 well a3 by another.lt is enough to say
that it is reasonable to believe In a moral system.
Thus we are supported by the teachings of theistic philo-
sophy, as veil as by both faith and reason, when we accept a
moral basis for our system. So far, our standpoint seems Justi-
fied. It remains to be 3hown that there is in this moral sys-
tem a place for evil.

5CHAPTER I.
Our Proposition not Incongruous with a Moral Purpose.
Come would deny the possibility of our proposi tion
/
on
the ground that it would make the whole system evil. They go on
the supposition that the admission of evil in a system would
t/t£
destroy its moral character. A^evil is ordinarily used, that
would possibly be implied. If evil were a metaphysical reality,
positive and indepen lent , there would be some ground for ob-
jection to evil In a moral system. Further discussion, however,
on the nature of evil, will show that we have no such impos-
sible proposition in mind.
Another objection sometimes raised against the possibi-
lity of evil in a moral system grows out of the meaning too
often put ift)o>o the word moral.lt is assumed that moral ex-
cludes the possibility of evil. This cannot be; for the meaning
of the term implies , rather than excludes, the possibility of
evil. Moral good must be free and volitional .Without a choice
in the matter, the good would be determined , and hence not mor-
al •
Theoretically , then, we must admit the possibility of mor-
al lapse. This possibility however , applies only to finite be-
ings, not to the Infinite. This does not imply that the Infinite
is righteous without choice, or loes not possess the elements
of true personality. God i3 not liable to moral lapse, because
perfection of attributes excludes all motives for the choice
of evil, and because He is free from ignorance and the limita

tions that lead to moral blunders .He is not exempt because of
any volitional impotence. In the Absolute perfect moral attri-
butes ant perfect knowledge preclude the choice of moral evil.
God, with infinite energy , embraces perfect standards from eter-
nity. With man it is not so. Here we find imperfection of nature
and limitation of knowledge. Man is often affected by the frail-
ties of human nature, and left helpless by ignorance and limi-
tations. In God we find indefectible moral gooinessjin man, con-
tingent moral goodness .Hence God can not sin, although he posses-
ses volitional freedom. But in the sphere of the finite, there
is always an alternati vity of choice ,because of his relativity,
or imposed relationship. With alternati vity necessarily goe3
the possibility, but not the necessity, of evil. In other words,
finite moral creatures are free to sin, or not to 3in.But in
no case is sin determined.
If then, our conception of moral links it with freedom,
it cannot be harmonized with determini sm ; for freedom and ne-
cessity can not exist together , since they mutually exclude each
other. As dependent beings, we are under the moral law, but we
become moral in the highest sense, only as we voluntarily obey
this law an 1 turn from evil.
It does not follow that a system in which such a possibil-
ity of evil is admitted, is contrary to a moral purpose. The
system, as a system, can 3till be perfect. Our system then, is not
moral in the sense of absolute, because it has in it a place

7for eviljit is not imperfect a3 a system , because the evil in
it is neither independent nor determined.
The result is, first, that there is a place for evil in
a moral system, and second, that the existence of evil is con-
sistent with a moral purpose, or with the goodness of C-od.How
this can be, will appear from a consideration of the nature
and the origin of evil.
i

8CHAPTER II.
The Nature of Evil,
•
Evil is of three kinds: physical, moral, an! metaphysical.
Ever since Leibnitz’ time
,
philosophers have had to distin-
guish between these three forms of evil. They may not agree
with Leibnitz in his final explanation of evil, but they are
froced to admit that an explanation of any one of these forms
of evil does not give U 3 adequate light on the origin or na-
ture of the whole problem .The jr may not concede that all evil
is privation, but they must recognize the fact that physical
and moral evil become intelligible only when properly distin-
guished from the metaphysical aspect of evil.
The source of evil , Leibnitz explains, is metaphysical imper-
fection; sin is privation,! s negative. This original imperfec-
/
tion is the "Cause iieale du mal".Yet Leibnitz is very careful
not to make evil necessary, or the result of God '3 consequent
will. Actual evil is one thing, and the ideal ground of evil is
quite another.
To this view Julius Mueller objects that it will not ex-
plain positive acts of the will. These must be more than nega-
tive, since man can concentrate his powers in doing evil. The
nature of such evil deeds will be more fully discussed under
the
-a* head of moral evil. Let it suffice here, to say that they need
not affect our position on the question of privation or origi-
nal imperfection.

9Mueller further raises these questions in reference to
Leibnitz' standpoint: "Does it agree with our experience?"
"Does it harmonize with conscience or with the feeling of ab-
horrence with which evil fills us?"The same reply must be
given here that we gave above. If we mean moral evil, Mueller
is right. Our experience is not with metaphysical imperfection,
but with actual evil wills and evil deeds. A bad conscience
and a feeling of abhorrence are not provoked by any sense of
privation .Yet it may result from a careful investigation of
this problem that In a certain sense , Leibnitz was right in
calling evil negative.

CHAPTER III.
Physical Evil.
Aristotle taught that the problem of the natural world
was unavoidably concealed from mortal man. To pry into this
mystery would be presumptuous impiety.Nature wa3 to him a
closed book. Physical science had not yet been developed; the
laws of the material world had not been discovered and de-
fined; 30 that the mind of man stood in awe of the great trans-
forming and destroying elements of nature. The forces of nature
were thought to be gods, giving vent to their wrath or mani-
festing their favor. Hence it was considered both expedient
and proper to please the gods and not disturb them by prying
into the realm of mysterious forces.
In our day of scientific knowledge, it is natural that we
should take a different attitude toward the forces of nature.
The natural laws have an attraction for us the like of which has
never been known before.Many of the most bd Iliant minds are
busy making investigations and trying experiments that shall
give us a better understanding of the natural world.
The problem of natural evil , however , still baffles the
minds of philosophers.lt is hard to conceive that it is not
incongruous with a beneficent world-plan. The most difficult
problem of evil that confronts us i3 that which arises in
connection with the so-called irrationalities of nature. Even
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optimists must admit that evil of this kind appears to be a
disorder. This is no proof , however, that the solution of at least
part of these difficulties must forever lie beyond the power
and dominion of man. Sven thouglill mysteries oannot be solved,
a contemplation of the problem of natural evil is none the less
helpful; for it will tend to dissipate absurdity as well as to
solve mystery.
Before we can discuss the question as to whether the prob-
Q
lem of physical evil is incongruous with t-he- beneficent world-
plan, we must arrive at some definition of physical evil.
In one sense, we might consider all that which we try to
shun, evil. Anything distasteful , anything irksome , anything that
we dread, would accordingly be stamped evil. It follows, then,
that all that which we hail with delight must be good.Te court
the goodjwe shun the evil. If that be our definition of evil,
the only criterion by which we could judge would be our own
immediate, personal feeling in the matter. We should then be
governed by taste and Inclination rather than by judgment.But
this can not be all of evil. In another sense we might consider
as evil that which we know will ultimately work destruction,
and a3 good, that which makes for final gain, though It prove dis-
tasteful at first. Here of course, only judgment can decide
what is to be called good, and what, evil .This does not mean
that judgment and disposition are necessarily at variance with
each other.lt only means that, without judgment , there can be
no iecision based on rational expediency .After the virtue
. jy
•
•
'
.
•
-
.
.
.
of a case is determined by judgment, it is quite natural that
our disposition should incline the same way. Thus it becomes
evident that physical good is that which seems both rational-
ly expedient and desirable, and physical evil is that which ap-
pears both absurd and disagreeable in the light of most ex-
tended knowle dge
.
But before we can pass final judgment a3 to the good or
evil of any given case, it is necessary to know the whole plan
that embraces it. We must further know whether the objects of
disorder (for so they appear to us) are, or are not, out of har-
mony with that plan. Too often we imagine that there i3 dis-
order because we see but a fragment of the plan. The merits
and demerits of a case are determined by inane liate conditions.
and
Our limited knowledge -©£ the brevity of our temporal experience
are 3uch, that things far away seem to us vague and uncertain.
Hence we seem to walk by sight rather than by thought and
faith. Whatever presents itself under the form of immediate dis-
order, is taken for real. The transient or merely incidental
occupies in our minds a place of prominence and takes on the
form of' the abiding. Could we but widen the range of our vision,
and look to the end, there is no doubt that we should lose
sight of many of our difficulties. Perhaps after all, physical
evil would turn out to be such only apparently.
^rong views on naturalism are frequently the prime cause
of difficulties which confront us in the consideration of this
problem. Too often we think that God has nothing to do with e-
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vents in the natural world. The tendency i 3 to limit God’s pow-
er, or to question the beneficence and validity of divine pur-
pose. It is thought that either God can not help in the case of
physical lisorder,or He will not.
Thus Plato regarded the world as an imperfect realization
of a divine idea. The Creator could not make a perfect world
out of the wretched material at his disposal. The nature of
his divine idea would seem to warrant a better world. In fact,
he seems to have believed that the object of God’s purpose
wa3 a perfect world ;but his power was too limited to produce
such.
Comte, carrying out the implications of reasoning on the
theological plane, boldly affirmed that, if God had the power
to create a better world than the one in which we live, the on-
ly reason for not having done so must be sought in his lack of
moral beneficence jfor the physical evil in the world, from the
theological point of view, he claims, is not a consequence of our
own free deeds, but a direct result of divine purpose .Hence it
is necessary to limit either God’s power or his goodness.
Mill also conceives of this world as an evil world, but of
God as constantly at work eliminating the evil. God’s impotence,
however , stands in the way of greater success. Unlike Comte, Mill
defends the moral character of God, but in agreement with him,
he reasons that it i 3 necessary to limit his power; for condi-
tions are not what they ought to be, and hence cannot be the
voluntary expression of a beneficent will.

14
Leibnitz* view is in contrast with the views mentioned
above. According to him, all evil is privation, is negative. Every-
thing created must be imperfect , for God can not create God.Mo-
rally and metaphysically, evil is but the absence of positive
goodjanl since physical evil flows from metaphysical evil, it is
only a necessary imperfection. These conditions Leibnitz harmo-
nizes with God’s goodness and power by distinguishing between
the antecedent and the consequent will of God.By the antecedent,
abstract will of God, good in general is willed(desired) ;but by
the consequent will, He wills that which, all things considered,
is best, though imperfect . The antecedent will has for it3 object
the ideal good; the consequent will has for its object the ac-
tual conditions as they are produced.
Although Leibnitx believes that the physical world is im-
perfect, he does not concede that there i3 more evil than good
in the world. In every 3ense the good outweighs the evil, whether
only among the human race, or among all intelligent beings, in-
cluding genii (angels) , or among all creatures , including animals.
By making this comparison, he accepts the quantitative estimate
of good and evil. Evil, though only a privation, is nevertheless
to be contrasted with good. The imperfect stands over against
the perfect; the actual^over against the ideal. This itself gives
us very little light on the nature of eviljbut it makes it all
the more certain that we have a problem to deal with, a problem
which obstinately returns as often as we set it aside. Thus Leib-r
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nitz still has his problem of evil, even though he has pro-
nounce! it negative and assured us that it is only a state of
imperfection, in the absence of the ideal good.
Furthermore, physical evil finds justification with Leib-
nitz in that it makes for good. The imperfect results in the
more perfect. Out of every condition of privation is born another,
possessing a greater degree of perfection. The very failures of
the imperfect teach us to shun the same and strive after some-
thing better. Thus evil becomes a part of the good order in the
physical world as well as in the moral.
Lotze objects to evil as a means of producing good, since
thi3 means ought to be employed only when minds are psychologi-
cally so defectively organized, that without this the end can
not be realized
.
,f Thy','he asks, "did God make minds so imperfect?"
And again, "How could evil be a means of good in the case of
unintelligent beings?"
Instead of Lotze’ s first question we might as well ask,
Why did not God give us wisdom equal to his own, so that we
should always know the good intuitively?Then, when we came to
the moral realm, we should have to ask, Why did he not make us
with natures like his own, so that we should always want to do
the good and have the power to do it?But if our natures were
thus determined, we could be nothing more than faultless auto-
mata. W9 should be as wothless as we were faultless j for moral
character is positive, and cannot exist without choice. Pepen-
I.
’
.
lent beings with determined moral attributes would be a contra-
diction. But relative beings
;
that possess freedom and power of
striving, may learn to overcome their own imperfections and thus
come nearer their goal of attainment.
In regard to Lotze’s second question, we need only reply
that all sentient beings are either instinctively or conscious-
ly aware of experiences .Bor non-sentient beings physical evil
does not really exist. It is true, physical conditions affect all
objects of nature, but the consequence appears as good or evil
only to sentient beings. All such consciously or unconsciously
profit by their experience .In unintelligent beings instinct
takes the place of reason. The usual distinction made between
intelligent and unintelligent beings 'therefore^ can not apply
here; for it already appears that^to some extent, even unintelli-
gent
,
sentient beings are capable of profiting by evil experi-
ences. It must not be inferred that 3uoh beings avoid only
things that are immediately disagreeable. We have an illustration
of the contrary in the animal, which suffers temporarily for the
4
sake of protecting its young, or^ avoiding future evil which it
dreads
.
Lotze sees no special virtue in suffering as a warning,
since this fact does not explain why the evil of which we are
warned is necessary. He does not leny the fact that suffering
is a warning, and that warning may prevent more evil; he only
raises the question, "Why must man come in contact with physical
evil at all? ,r Since this problem will receive more attention
',
.
.
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at the close of our present chapter, we shall leave it now.
According to Lotze, moral evil flows from metaphysical,
ani physical in turn, from moral. In other words, owing to this
Imperfect nature, man sinsjbecause he sins, he suffers. We are
at once at a loss to account for the suffering of the innocent.
If justice is to continue, why did not nature correct this con-
dition long ago and keep the innocent from sufferlng?3ome may
answer that there are no innocent , since humanity by Its own
revolt precipitated itself into error and suffering; that an
act of humanity corrupted the hearts of the whole race. But it
i3 only by a stretch of the imagination that we can attribute
a voluntary act of sin to the race collectively. Such a collec-
tive conception of sinning humanity, means nothing whatever.
Moreover, physical evil i3 not only a retributive outcome of
moral evil.It is true, moral and physical evil seem to be close-
ly connected.Disobedience to moral law is not without its phys-
ical consequences } for here also, man reap3 what he sows. On the
other hand, disobedience can not be the only cause of physical
evil; warning and correction cannot be the whole purpose of suf-
fering. The nature of physical evil is something more closely
connected with the fundamental nature of being.
BQyce explains evil by philosophical idealism. All sin, all
imperfection,all suffering, is found only in the temporal or-
der. The final good i3 in the eternal order. Evil is not an il-
lusionjit is not only a privationjit is a positive, though de-
fective, undesirable, fragmentary expression of the good order.
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Suffering then, is a temporal realityjbut it has no place in the
eternal order any more than moral evil has. In his work entitled,
"The World and the Individual',’ he contends in the chapter on
‘'The Struggle with Evil", that morally evil deeds and ill for-
tunes of mankind are inseparably linked aspects of the temporal
order, since il^lforttne, as ell as morally evil deeds
/
result
from the defective expression of some finite will.
Royce likewise holds that there is a "Soul of goodness
in things evil" .Without suffering, life would not be perfect.
The very presence of ill in the temporal order is a condition
of perfection in the eternal order; for this condition makes room
for a conscious struggle toward a goal, without which there can
be no fulfilment or attainment .Through this struggle, the soul
seeks its completion in the eternal order, where, free from the
ills of the finite, it becomes one with the Infinite.
Eiske agrees with Royce in hi 3 view, that everything is
a fragment of the dramatic whole. Goddness, joy, pain, wickedness,
- all are necessary to make a complete, perfect world. Each frag-
ment, though defective and di stasteful, serves its purpose. Every-
thing is an essential fragment of the good order.
A careful study of the priciples of causality will help to
reveal the true nature of the physical world.lt will help us
to see that a free, intelligent causality must lie back of all
things. Nothing can be thought of a 3 independent from a volition-
al, creative will. If we couple with this the conception of a
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larger world plan, as suggested above, we eome to see that "God
is indeed in all thingsjbut that he is in some for their fur-
therance in others for their change and destruction."
Hence
;
the objects of this order^ as they appear to us, may
be only necessary steps in the working out of that larger plan.
Instead of being out of harmony with it, they may serve to
bring about a development of conditions that are all for the
be3t
.
It may not be possible to solve the entire problem of human
suffering, or of physical evil generallyjbut we can attain to
practical certainty that it is not out of harmony with a bene-
i
ficent world plan. We observed above that physical evil is close-
ly connected with moral evil, that there is unity in the funda-
mental nature of our being. This may not always appear in the
relations of our present life. Even where these relations do ex-
ist, our present knowledge does not always reveal it to us. We
must bear in mind however, that our present knowledge is limited.
The world plan in its entirety is concealed from our narrow
vision. If we knew the entire plan and could 3ee through all
things, we might be able in some way to justify every particular
case of physical suffering. As it is, we must determine from the
general trend of things. We cannot tell in each case just why
that particular suffering; but walking by thought and faith, we
can attain to rational certainty, that there is nothing incon-
gruous between a faith in God’s goodness and the presence of
<-
natural evil in the world.
Hence it is only rational to infer that physical evil can
not be wholly excluded from the world of temporal, human beings.
It is not necessary to adopt the conception of philosophical i-
dealisra, advocated by Hoyce,in order to form a consistent theory
of physical eviljbut^no doubt, there is much truth in that part
of hi 3 view which demands a conscious struggle of the individu-
al's a condition of attainment .Could created beings who are
not God, but who are just what they are, dependent beings, but
with almost infinite possibilities of development , ever become
what they ought to be, if conditions were other than they are?
Ho law of reason demands that they should. Our experience does
not teach us that they would. He might further raise such ques-
tions as these, Would life be poorer or richer without pain and
suffering?Woul i social life, with all its advantages of unsel-
fish joy ever have blessed human! ty, without the conditions that
brought us into contact with natural evil?Would the human soul
ever appfoach the ideal set before it, if it were not for the
very conditions that surround it?To say that suffering i3 in
general desirable does not necessarily lead to mysticism. In fact,
suffering is hardly ever sought or desired di rectly; yet
}
after
it has been endured, we often feel that it lias enriched our ex-
perience and made life more precious.
oo far -4ihon, physical evil - oojms to bo in—harmony with

We find an illy strati on ready to hand in nature. A bit of
sand or some other hard substance finds its way into the soft
flesh of the oyster .Irritation ensues, death threatens ;but na-
ture has1 male provision against this calamity. The oyster de-
posits round the source of irritation a fluid secretion. This
i
harlen3,anl we have the beginning of a pearl , nature ’
3
fairest
gem. Nor is the work completed all at once. The pearl owes its
peculiar iridescence to the fact that this calcareous substance
is not all deposited at one and the same time, but in successive
layers.
To some extent then
,
physical evil seems to be in harmony
with a beneficent world plan. It is only natural, therefore,
that it should be closely connected with the fundamental na-
ture of being.lt may not be an essential fragment of the whole,
of the eternal, as Royce would have it;but,If not that, it must
still be in perfect harmony with a beneficent plan of divine
causality.

CHAPTER IV.
Moral Evil.
It is impossible to define moral evil in short definite
terms. In a general way it is thought of as a conscious trans-
gression of the moral law, a conscious choosing of the worse in
presence of the better, or a conscious doing of something less
than the best. These definitions emphasize what is fundamental
in moral evil, but they are inadequate. An adequate conception
of moral evil implies also an understanding of the human atti-
tude toward evil deeds. They may be obnoxious to us, but that is
not necessarily the case; for abhorrence does not always serve
a3 a sufficient norm whereby to measure evil . Sometimes even
/
the good in the form of duty seems irksome. At other times, man
seems to delight in evil though his judgment condemns it. Moral-
ly speaking, we cannot always say that man courts the good and
shuns the evil.
If we say that only that is good which an enlijfghtened
conscience feels ought to be, we have gained a somewhat broader
and more accurate view of moral good. Sin , then, is that which our
moral sense tell3 us ought not to be. Hence by the power of 3ome
insight, we call one thing good and another evil. We recognize
truth and are able to distinguish righteouness from evil, be-
cause we are endowed with the moral sense and blessed with in-
telligence .It is by virtue of a moral , rational nature that we
call good, good, and evil, evil. Sin is contrary to both moral con-
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viction and rational insight. No moral support of sin can be
thought of, because sin is immoral. No rational excuse for sin
can be made, because sin is irrational.
But whence this moral sense, and whence the intelligence to
guide us in our choice and determine the nature of our judg-
ment?This question belongs partly to the next chapter ;but lest
there should be some objection to the stand taken in the para-
graph above, it should be observed here that it makes no dif-
ference how man came into possession of his present endowment.
We know that he i8 thus endowed. The method of realization is
incidental J the fact i3 important . The value of the moral sense
is in the quality of the true freeman with inner dignity. Grant-
ed that this quality of the higher self came into man from some
power not himself
;
granted, that it came by some process of evolu-
tion, whether mechanically, as Spencer,Bergson, and some others
believe, or as idealistic philosophers maintain, namely, that "the
will to live, acting upon matter, evolves organisms we call men,
ftho in the course of time develope the power of asking questions
concerning their origin and relation to other phenomena; granted,
that it may still be relative , that our standard of conduct and
moral attributes are variable,- granted, that all these things
are true, the moral-rational nature of man would 3till be a fact,
and consequently man would be a responsible moral being.
3ome philosophers attribute this power of judging moral
truths to the evolution of ideals. Thus Biske,in his little
book ^"Through Nature to God"
;
says: "Morality comes on the scene
<*
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when there is an alternative offered of leading better lives or
worse lives." An again, "Moral evil is simply^ characteristic of
the lower states of being as looked at from the higher states."
According to this view, moral good, as veil as moral evil^is re-
lative. All deeds are in a sense defective expressions of the
natural impulses. 3o far, there may be no obj ection,but ^iske is
subject to criticism ,when he permits the implication that nature
is automatically expressing itself in terms of life. Hence this
view not only makes all spiritual faculties a development of
naturejit is essentially mechanical, for all change is automatic,
and the cause is but a blind force of nature. Being develop^s
itself. We are perplexed to know what adequate cause lies back of
it all .How , under such conditions, did conscious life appear?How
could consciousness awaken?Consciousness could not well have
been produced by blind organisms. The argument, that it appears
very faintly at first and becomes more definite as the process
goes on,doe3 not diminish the difficulty.lt is still a new fact,
a new power, that somehow has been added to the organism of an
individual. A conscious life represents not only an organism; it
embodies a free, unitary and definite self. This self may have
appeared under the form of gradual development , but it can have
come only from some source that already embodied in itself the
quality of personal selfconsciousness. And what can be said of
the source of consciousness , can be sail also of the moral facul-
ties of our ethical nature. Ethical standards may change; the

moral sense may growjbut however It expresses Itself, the fact
remains that it is there, and that it must he accounted for
in some adequate way. Whence our ideal of a moral life?-an ideal
which, though it be relative, is nevertheless better than our
present attainments . The only rational explanation is to refer
the moral nature of man to the influence of a free, causal act
of an infinte personal will. Hence it is quite correct to say
that we are endowed with a moral sense and blessed with intel-
ligence enough to find our way in the realm of ethical conduct,
even though our consciousness unfold gradually and our moral
sense grow with experience.Thi3 evolution i3 not a mechanical
one, but it results from some adequate source and proceeds ac-
corling to some plan.
In regard to Piske’s view the question al30 arises, Is it
when the alternatives are offered, or when we act in the face
of those alternatives , that our lives become moral? Temporally,
this may 3eem to be a distinction without a difference, for we
do not always contemplate principles before we act .Sometimes
the
act even seems to be one with the decision.But while there
may not be much difference temporally, logically the difference
is fundamental .Perceiving evil is not identical with partici-
pating in evil. Our standards of measuring right and wrong may
change.Indeed^we know that they have changed, and are constantly
changing. But a deed is moral or immoral for us according to the
light in which it is performed. What is morally wrong for us to-
'.
.
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day, in an age of enlightenment and civilization, was not neces-
sarily so for our ancestors many generations ago. What is moral-
ly wrong today was always materially bad, that is, would have ap-
peared wrong^ to a more highly developed moral consciousness .In
fact, all relative conduct must be conceived as materially wrong,
since it would appear so to a perfect moral consciousness. Moral
evil then, has nothing to do with the characteristics of the
lower states of being a3 looked at from 30me higher state. All
that -thdrS- statement can possibly mean is that our understanding
of moral right and wrong is growing. But all deeds that are an
inadequate expression of a moral ideal we possess at the time,
whether high or low, are morally evil, because they are less than
the best that is known to us. It is true, that we gain a higher
degree of moral perfection by the conscious striving toward our
ideal, even thou gh after we have attained it, we come to look
back upon it as relative. This is unavoidable where there is moral
progress. The standard changes with each succeeding epoch and
attainment .But what is there, morally speaking, in right conduct
to make it righteous, or in purity of feeling to make it pure,
except the purpose to be righteous and to be pure?In the same
way moral evil is but the consious purpose to be other than
our highest ideal represents to us.
This thought becomes clearer when we further distinguish
between error and sin. Error consists in passing false judgments.
It constitutes one element of wrong action, but it is not sin.
-
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Error and sin are closely related, but they are distinct . Truth
and error, in finite minds, are both relative, just as we have seen
that right and wrong can be relative. Notwithstanding this close
connection and this parallelism , there is a very definite distinc-
tion.Error is seated in the intellect ; sin is an act of the will.
Just this volitional element is necessary to make an act sinful.
Before summing up our conclusions on the problem of moral
evil.it seems best to indicate briefly the views of noted philo-
sophers who have labored in this field.
Leibnitz maintains that there can be no moral evil without
freedom of will, yet he denies that evil deeds are positive. He
believes that God chose the best in creating the world, but holds
that the best plan does not necessarily exclude evil. The world
is the best possible, notwithstanding the evil in it. In reply to
Bayle’s argument that God should cause virtue pf he could, since
"the greatest love which a ruler can show for virtue is to cause
it", Leibnitz answers: "When we detach things that are connected
together,- the parts from the whole, the human race from the uni-
verse, the attributes of God from each other, his power from his
wisdom, -we are permitted to say that God can cause virtue to be in
the world without any admixture of vice, and even that he may
easily cause it to be so. "But he does not cause it, says Leibnitz
because the good of the whole universe requires the permission
of evil. Though he does not say so very definitely, he undoubtedly
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means that there must be free , conscious striving to live up to
an ideal or to comply with a moral law before there can be moral
goodjbut he overlooks the fact that conscious willing to do evil
can be just as positive as conscious willing to do good. God is
not responsible for evil, says Leibnitz , since he does not directly
will it, but merely makes it possible. The power to act is perfect
and good and comes from Godjbut the negative element , which is
sin (weakness) , comes from the agent himself.
To this view Julius Mueller replies: "If the Theodicee
teaches only a possibility of sin, then it should have examined
the relation of free will to evil, for sin would then be an act of
free will unbiassed by necessity." He further claims that sin
cannot be attributed to freedom alone, for sin does not exist
until freedom has been sacrificed. He does not believe that evil
can be explained by the freedom of the will, and asks, "Will this
theory of privation explain positive acts of the will as well as
weaknesses?"
Moral evil, according to Mueller, is an operative principle,
a perverting influence, pervading man’s whole nature.lt can not
be explained as privation or inetaphysical Imperfect! on.Wor can
it be derived from man’s sensuous nature, nor from contrasts of
individual lives. The operative principle is a wilful turning a-
way from God. Selfishness lies at the base of this sinful atti-
tude. "The idol which man in sin 3ets up in place of God can be
none other than himself. "He makes self and self-satisfaction the
;‘
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highest aim of his moral life. The innermost essence of sin, the
ruling and penetrating principle in all its forms, is selfishness.
Moral evil, according to this view, is more than negative.lt is
positive just as moral good is positive.
Spinoza’s conception of evil is intellectualistic,like his
conception of being. Adequate ideas conceive their objects. The f"*
is realized through knowledge. A lack of the good i3 a lack of
knowledge. Virtue is knowledge; sin is ignorance or perverted
knowledge. Knowledge of the bad is an inadequate idea. It is a
concept of imperfection and expresses nothing positive. Sin, then,
is only a lesser reality, The difference between good and evil
is one of degree.
James Martineau makes of sin a personal matter that cannot
be traced to any foreign source. The essence of it lies in the
conscious free choice of the worse in the presence of the better,
no less possible.
Kant made moral evil phenomenal .He derives it from sense,
not from man’s intelligible or ideal essence.
According to Royce, moral as well as natural evil is in God.
The existence of it is necessary
}
that we might have perfection;
for only through a conscious struggle toward a goal is fulfil-
ment reached. Even the evil will of the individual is God’s will;
for according to his idealistic philosophy, the individual will
is included in the absolute will. This view, without further com-
ments, would make God a contradiction rather than a perfect being,
Hence^in another work entitled^ "The World and the Individual’^
..
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the author modifies this position somewhat to preserve the per-
fection of God. He there makes sin a deliberate forgetting that re-
* suits from a conscious narrowing of the field of attention.But
just this deliberate forgetting must be a conscious act of the
will, which is included in the absolute will.
Royce further distinguishes in the same work between the
temporal and the eternal order
;
to show that sinners can not make
the world less than perfect. The individual can make his world
better or worse, since moral acts occur in timejbut thi3 does not
affect the eternal whole. f, The finite act of willing evil is i-
dentical with the absolute will only so far as it is the absolute
will that the individual actor should be in his measure free.
But the absolute will, as such, is just what the finite agent at
the time of doing evil denies by declining to attend to it.'’
Here what ought to be and what is fall apart in the temporal or-
der, while in the eternal order even the evil will of the indi-
vidual is God’s fill, so far as God wills that the individual
should be free. Hence this evil will of the individual is nothing
on the one hand, while on the other it is directly or indirectly
a part of the whole.
FechHer treats the problem of evil as something more rea-
listic. But with him, too, the fact of evil must not be considered
apart from the effort to remove it. Evil spurs to effort, and ef-
fort is essential to progress .Good is the fruit of energetic
labor that has need of its opposite since it is obtainable only
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through the conflict with evil.
The mystics hel l similar views. Boehme, for example, main-
tained that there must he evil, that good might become knowable.
He ioes not make evil a condition for the existence of good,
but a condition for recognizing it.
The contention made by Fechner that effort is essential to
progress, should receive all the emphasis that can be given to it.
There is also a measure of truth in his statement that evil spurs
to effort; for if the individual becomes dissatisfied with his
present low state, he will strive toward some higher achievement.
But when Fechner affirms that good has need of its opposite,
since it is attainable only through the conflict with evil, he
ignores the distinction between imperfection of nature and the
positive evil will. There must be relativity to make room for
striving, but there need not be positive evil acts.
In many of these views the metaphysical aspect is more promi-
nent than the moral. Hence a fuller discussion of them must be
deferred till later.
We come to the following conclusions concerning moral evil:—
First, moral evil must be free and volitional. The scheme of
necessity finds no place in a moral system. A determined act can
have no ethical value for the one who performs that act. All deeds
would be without any. moral quality, if they were not free. This
freedom implies the power of choosing between alternatives .The
. 0
.
.
.
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choice can not he determined. A determined choice is a contradic-
tion. Necessary volition is inconceivable. Just as the good deeds
of man must be his own to be called moral, so his evil deeds must
be his own voluntary selfexpression if they are to have in them
any content of sin. We have seen that the one thing needed to
make conduct morally right and feeling morally pure is the wish
and purpose to be righteous and to be pure. On a mechanical plane
there is not place for a moral agent.Both moral good and moral
evil are more than a material condition, a state, or an abstrac-
tion. They do not exist in the abstract at all.Moral good is the
good of an individual willjmoral evil is the evil of an indi-
vidual will. Moral is a quality of free selfexpression ; it embodies
the purpose of a free volitional personality.
A free moral agent is not without moral responsibility.
He is considered responsible on the ground that he chooses his
own course. Without this freedom of choice it would be unjust
to attach any responsibility to him for the deeds he does. It
is a pure contradiction to say that an individual lias nothing
to do with the kind of life he leads, and at the same time hold
him responsible for the things he does.By what justice, or by
what law of reason, can we find any excuse for either praise or
blame, for either reward or punishment , if all the deeds of men
are determined?^! ther we must grant that man is wholly unmoral,
that he neither merits praise nor de/’serves censure for anything
that he does, that all hi 3 acts have no greater significance
than the ordinary events of the material world, or, we must con—
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dede that his acts are free and volitional, in consequence of
which, man becomes a free moral agent.
Second^Moral evil is more than privation. Any negative view
is inadequate to explain the vigor with which evil wills operate
in the world of moral beings. Whatever we may have to say of it
as a metaphysical principle , sin^ in its moral aspects^ is a hid-
eous reality. Moral evil is positive ^because it is free and vo-
litional. Imperfection is not the direct result of volition. Pri-
vation is not the object of our striving,not the end that we
consciously choose.Moral evil, on the other hand, is a conscious
choice of something less than the best. Even sins of omission are
positive when truth is consciously ignored. Just this conscious,
positive element makes an act of the will either morally good
or morally evil. Moral conduct can not be wholly accounted for
on the ground of metaphysical imperfection. The positive element
enters here by virtue of our volitional freedom and power of
choice. All deeds, it is true, are directly or indirectly an ex-
pression of our natural impulses. These impulses express them selva
in two directions. They are affected more or less by the influence
of environment or disposition. This truth is 30 evident, that fre-
quently we hear it said that impulses determine man’s actions.
But can we let that pass as an unqualified statement?What of
the free agency of man?Where then, is the volition which is ne-
cessary to make an act moral?Owing to this freedom an act of the
will becomes positive.

There must be impulses^ ani even misdirected impulses are
better than no impulses at all, for a soul without impulses
would be a soul without wants. The result would be a life without
expression and without effort .Impulses are a condition of ac-
tivity, but they do not determine the moral qualities of our
acts. Neither do they wholly determine what our life shall be
morally or in any other respect; for we have seen that the will
may become a directing force as soon as we have gained suffici-
ent knowledge to know what is expedient. But misdirected impuls-
es lie at the root of moral evil.
There are still other reasons , and ^in a sense
}
weightier rea-
sons, for objection against the inference that man is wholly a
child of circumstances. Experience teaches us that man eventual-
ly learns which influences make for higher good and which are
stimulated by selfish desires. Or, bearing in mind what was said
about good and evil being relative, man learns sooner or later
in which impulses the will of God expresses itself most per-
fectly. As soon as man learns this truth, the volitional element
enters into play, and under the sway of the will deeds become
both positive and moral. Hence moral evil may now be defined as
that disturbance 6f life which arises from free selfdetermination
to choose a course for our moral life, which course is unworthy
of the moral ideal that we possess.
The apparent justification of moral evil by Leibnitz is
the most unsatisfactory part of his theodicee. Moral evil^by its
very nature, must be positive.Bad deeds and dispositions may be

wrong materially, even where consci ousness of a wrong is lacking;
but there can be no moral wrong and no responsibility unless
there is a positive evil will, a conscious choice of something
less than the best.
Third^Moral evil must, in a sense,be relative.lt is not the
natural'-state of man to consciously choose evil. Sin is not con-
sistent with the nature of an enlightened conscience ; sin is un-
natural and irrational.lt is not expedient for man to sin. We
do not believe that the natural state of man is diabolical and
that the regenerate man is unnatural. Rather, we believe that man
approaches his true destiny when he grows morally. The imperfect
in man should constantly give way to a higher degree of per-
fect! on. Go far, the teaching of the Hindu poet and philosopher,
Tagore^is doubtless true, when he declares that evil, moral as
well a3 physical and metaphysical, is only an imperfect, imperma-
nent fragment of truth or being. All moral progress necessarily
implies that .Wherever there is a tendency toward moral progress
in the individual, there life instinctively takes a wider view
than that of present failures . "It has an ideal of perfection
which ever carries it beyond its present limitations."
It may be necessary , however , at this juncture to remind
ourselves that, though moral evil is in a sense relative^imper-
manent,it none the less confronts both individuals and the
race as a very persistent disorder. The evil will of the indi-
vidual often determines to pursue an unworthy object. Perverted
I'
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impulses result in habits that too often turn the tide of moral
progress .Evil at times seems to grow rather than diminish.lt
asserts itself as a positive influence that interrupts moral
progress in both the individual and the race. Hence it is positive
in that it is selfdetermination, and often defeats temporarily
some fragment of the larger plan for moral progressjbut rela-
tive, in that it never wholly triumphs over that larger plan.
There is always this advantage that moral good has over
moral evil: there is perfect inner harmony of good, while evil
invariably destroys itself. "To be carnally minded is death,
but to be spiritually minded is life," @r,to quote a£ain from
the same apostle, "^he wages of sin is death." The impermanence
of moral evil^then , cannot be said to be of such nature that
all evil necessarily turns into good. It is impermanent in an-
other sense. If the evil will persists, so that evil acts and
habits follow, life will spend itself in sin. But whenever the -ge~
good will prevails , moral attributes multiply. Our standard of
moral good changes as our moral nature developes and our know-
ledge 6f the good increases. The conclusion ,then, seem3 warrant-
ed that the only guarantee for permanence is the victory of
good over evil and of truth over error. The selfish, wicked
,
stupid will must give way to the more perfect will or meet
death.
Fourth* Moral good is not dependent upon moral evil. The
verdict that it is obtainable only through a conflict with

evil, tbit it has need of its opposite, appeals strongly to the
imagination, but it is not 30 convincing upon careful reflec-
tion. The imagination says, Everything must have its counterpart
in something else of an opposite nature. Reason demands an ade-
quate ground for the existence of all that is affirmed. Is ,then
J
the wicked will of the individual a necessary ground for the
existence of the good will? It must be borne in mind that mo-
ral good and moral evil are diametrically opposite. They mutu-
ally exclude each other. Whatever the standard 6f the individu-
al, be it relative or absolute, the quality of a moral deed de-
pends upon the intent of the individual^ and not upon the stan-
dard which serves as a criterion whereby his actions are
judged. Hence, on any plane there is room for opposing wills.
But if, by the power and freedom of choice ^the good is willed,
it does not follow that this act of willing must have for its
ground the opposite evil will. Reason demands only free person-
al volition.lt does not rationally follow, that there must
be moral evil that there might be moral good. There must be
the possibility of moral evil^of course; otherwise man would
not be free.If, however, when he discovers his moral freedom
and a moral sense of right and wrong hasjbeen born within him,
—
if then he should unerringly choose the good he would not com-
mit sin. He would, as it were, come face to face with the possi-
bitlity of evil. He would be conscious that the moral sense
within him approves certain possibilities and condemns others;
.-
-
-
but he would not actually participate in evil and be guilty
of sin.On the contrary, he would escape moral evil by acting
in a normal, rational way, while his action would still be vo-
litional. This is possible because the moral quality of the
deed depends; not upon the positive evil will combated or over-
come, but upon the fact that it is a good deed freely done. Or,
to express it in more definite terms, moral good in finite be-
ings is a free, conscious effort to realize one’s highest ideals.
Fifth^Imperfection may in a measure become the occasion
of moral attainment .We have already seen that a deed, in order
to be moral, must be consciously volitional. We came to the con-
clusion that moral good in finite beings wa3 a free, conscious
effort to realize one’s highest ideals. This very effort to re-
alize an ideal implies a state of relativity. The desire and ef-
fort to rise above the present plane of attainment results in
the realization of our ideal.But there might not be that desire
and effort, were it not for a dissatisfaction with our state of
imperfection .The argument here is not, that we must have positive
evil, but that imperfection and the consciousness of it may
lead to moral attainment .We find the reason for this in the
fact that a desire to rise above our present attainments and to
come nearer to our ideal results in a conscious striving. Con-
scious striving is the soul of moral achievement .In the lives
of finite individuals, at least, it is an essential factor in
the moral life. It makes the moral achievement more ou T own, in
contrast with mere formal rightness that could conceivably be

imposed.
"It were better youth should strive through act3 uncouth,
Toward making, than repose on aught found made."
Not only the imperfection in man’s moral nature, but im-
perfection in the whole phenomenal world as well, may serve as
a means, used of God, to bring about our moral development .The
presence of physical evil in the world helps to make our expe-
rience the occasion of our moral consciousness. For may we not
eventually come to regard things as morally wrong because v/e
know them to be hurtful, disastrous, irrational? We learn by ex-
perience, but fortunately for us, each generation does not need
to pass through the whole chain of experiences from the very
beginning, in order to acquire moral standards. We have a large
fund of knowledge handed down to us from preceding generations.
With this knowledge come also standards of moral conduct and
moral attributes. We profit by those and by the moral truths
revealed to us by divine inspirationjbut yet our conception is
constantly being enlarged by our own personal experience.
Hence we may find an incentive to strive toward a reali-
zation of our growing ideal, chiefly because we are conscious
of our relative attainment . This ideal is a shadow of our des-
tiny. We follow it
#
but cannot reach it until we attain perfec-
tion. Whether this full attainment 3hall ever be reached can
not be known. The relative can not comprehend the absolute.
But we do know that there can be progress, and that the incen-
.
tive for making progress oomes largely from a dissatisfaction
with our present attainment.
CHAPTER V.
The Metaphysical Aspect of Evil.
After all that might be sail on the subject of' moral evil,
the ultimate problem remains unsolved. In our study of moral evil
it was necessary to enter somewhat into a discussion of the
nature of sin. This took us partly into the realm of metaphysics.
The question of first principles however, did not receive suf-
ficient consideration. The relation of evil to ultimate causal-
ity, its essential nature, and its fundamental relations to fi- -
nite persons, must be more fully considered.
Let us remind ourselves again that a moral system is as-
sumed. ^e attempt only to account for the presence of evil in
this 3y3tem.If . then, we make God the final cause of all things
in the universe, evil must be accounted for in 3ome satisfactory
way without contradicting our original presupposition of a
moral system.
The Creator and Preserver of our system cannot be held
directly responsible for all the evil in the world, unless we
infer that all evil is an essential factor in the development
of moral consciousness.But let us suppose for example, that the
evil will of the individual is not essential. If, then, this evil
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will of the individual shouli he determined by the creative
will of God, it would follow that God had not done wisely, for
this evil will is undesirable , deplorable , destructive of much
good. Furthermore , this evil will is opposed to what we take to
be God’s will.Has God, then, determined that his will shall be
contradicted? We are logically driven to such a conclusion if
we maintain that God directly determines the evil will of the
individual .Hence^ we readily see that the scheme of necessity
does not do away with the problem of evil. It makes the whole
moral system a contradiction because it makes God himself a
contradiction.
Besides making God contradict himself, the scheme of ne-
cessity makes moral eviljOr sin, impossible. There can be no mo-
rality without freedom; for we have seen that a deed, in order to
be moral, must be a free conscious act of a volitional agent.
Moral perfection can exist only in a world of free persons; de-
termined virtue is a contradiction. "In a sinless world there
might be outward marks of perfection, but no moral element."
Determined moral evil i 3 equally aa impossible as determined
moral good. Under necessity sin would not be sin. There might be
a wretched state of affairs but no conscious sinning, hence no
moral evil.
The real nature of moral good and of moral evil now be-
comes more apparent. A3 we noticed in the beginning, moral is
not the same as virtuous or sinless. In the introduction we
..
.
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made a distinction between the moral good of aj/Aindividual and
the absolute good of God.^e saw that for God no objective moral
law existed. He is good because it is his nature to be good.
Whether or not God attained to this completeness and perfection
of character by free selfdetermination is q question finite
knowledge cannot deoiie.lt is within the province of human ex-
perience and human knowledge, however, to observe to what extent
obedience to moral law tends to develope finite character. We
know that what at first requires conscious effort , eventually
becomes easy.Man* 3 character can become fixed to a certain ex-
tent,i.e.,he can do many things that duty demands without, at
the time being' at least, being conscious of the demand. He is
governed by a subjective powerjhe becomes a law unto himself.
This is the normal thing to expect in the development of char-
acter. The character of man determines what he does. This tenden-
cy of finite character proves the truth of the injunction:
"Sow a thought, and you reap an act; sow an act, and you reap a
habit; sow a habit, and you reap a character ; sow a character^ and
you reap a destiny."
Thus man may grow less conscious of an objective moral
law as he becomes more virtuous. Though the moral law still ex-
ists for him, he i 3 not directly conscious of it in his own life
He is dead to the law because he is prompted by a power within
him. Just as the child in innocency is unmoral but not immoral,
because it knows nothing of the moral law, so the man of ripened
•"
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character is both mo*al ani virtuous because he spontaneously
meAts the demands of the moral law.
We might further discuss the question now: Was the evil
r will of the individual essential that man might become morally
good and virtuous?Leibnitz argues that evil is unavoidable, that
all created must be imperfect.If this imperfection means only
relativity, there may be consistency in Leibnitz’ view. If not,
it makes the whole moral system a contradiction,becauae it makes
God a contradiction.But does this view of imperfection account
for the positive acts of evil done voluntarily?Does the mere
fact of privation prove that the evil will of the individual and
the positive act of sinning by him are essential in the develop-
ment of man's character? The complete answer to this question
will have to be deferred until we iiscuss more fully Leibnitz'
view of evil. For the present, we can only say that this does not
result directly.
To consider more fully Leibnitz' view of evil, we must notice
that he makes only the good real. God is the sum of reality, "Fns
realls 8imus" ,but all created is imperfect .Primitive good, as well
as the origin of evil, is found in the region of eternal truths,
"region ie verites eternelles" .This, however,! 3 only the ideal
'J ground of evil, since evil i 3 negative and has no efficient cause.
God wills only the good in general, but he cannot create the per-
fect. Good in general is the object of God as knowledge, the object
of his antecedent willjbut things in particular, things as they
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are, are the objects of his consequent will. The consequent will
not only knows and prefers, but establishes and produces results,
as .veil. This distinction by Leibnitz brings out a view which un-
necessarily limits God. According to it, we must say that God de-
sires good, but cannot have it. The ideal world of God, then, is a
sinldss world, a world without eviljbut the actual world falls
short of all these perfections.
Again, God is limited if we 3ay that the evil will of the in-
dividual i 3 necessary for the existence of good. It is true, there
could not be just that moral act of overcoming moral evil unless
the evil will exited. But loes it follow that God could not have
made virtuous beings without it? We have said that Leibnitz may
be consistent in his conclusion that all relativity is unavoid-
able ;but if we make positive evil deeds necessary, we imply that
God, and not man, is directly responsible for all disobedience and
sin. It would then follow that God himself could not have dispensed
with the positive rebellious will of the individual
>
ln working
out hi 3 infinite plans.
If God could not have made possible a good world without ac-
tual sin, he would be limited by an external condition. Hence this
condition ought to be called God rather than the agent which it
limits. A3 a matter of fact, God is not limited by objective laws
or truths, because no such laws or truths can exist for God. If God
is bound by any law, it i 3 because he imposes it upon himself. Laws
and truths, to God, are subjective. They are only the proper "modus
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agendi” of hia own spiritual activity. But while God cannot be
limited by external law3,he is governed by hi 3 won inner charac-
ter. Hence if he, in his infinite wisdom, should see fit to make pos-
sible the evil deeds of men , 30 that they might by free volition
determine their own moral character and pass on to perfection ,it
would be consistent with a beneficent world plan to do so. But this
is not the same as mkking sin itself necessary.
He are now ready to answer more definitely the question, Has
the evil will of the individual essential that he might become
morally good and virtuous? So far as God was concerned, we know
that it was not. Therefore it is only rational to believe that God
did not determine man’s evil will. What God did was to make man a
free being, to give him the power and opportunity of selfdirection
.
More will be said on this subject when we consider the origin of
evil. It is now time to ask, Vas the evil will of the individual
an essential factor for man’s development , so far as he himself
was concerned?Bach individual chooses either good or evil. Circum-
stances and influences help in a learge measure to affect man’s
choice?Upon the other hand, his free volition can, and of&en does,
predominate over his impulses, and is a means of withstanding and
overcoming circumstances. Notwithstanding outward influences,man
is a free agent, and has a power of deliberate choice. He is not
compelled to will evil before he can become qualified to will the
good. It is conceivable that he should be conscious of two pos-
sibilities before him
;
and yet invariably act wisely by choosing
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the better part. Experience farther teaches us that there 13 a
marked degree of difference between individuals in this respect;
and the comparison almost invariably reflects credit upon the
individual who wills the minimum amount of evil and the maximum
amount of good. Ability to will the good does not in the least de-
pend upon having first willed evil .Why, then, should toe hold that
actual sin i3 necessary for the existence of moral good? Relati-
vity, imperfect! on, we have always with us, though this may change
with increasing knowledge and virtue ;But by what law of thought
are we compelled to say that man must consciously choose to do
worse than he knows, so that he may find it possible to do the goad
that he would consciously strive after? Choice there must be be-
fore we can have virtue; but sin is not an essential factor in pro-
ducing virtue. The assertion that nothing can exist without con-
trast is a figment of the imagination, not a conclusion reached by
sound reason.
To further understand the metaphysical nature of evil, it is
necessary to distinguish between abstract sin and sinful deed3.
Sin in the abstract exists only as a class term in the mind. To be-
lieve that it is anything more is a result of superficial reason-
ing. Sinful deeds and evil wills are real. They are never found a-
* part from the individual to whom they belong. Hence evil disposi-
tions had to arise and wicked deeds had to occur, before there
could be moral evil. The question argued here is: Sin as a principle
was not first, and sinful deeds later. Evil as a principle does not
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exist apart from voluntary individual acts of sin. There may be
what i 3 called a sinful attitude;but this attitude is determined
wholly by the individual will and the acts which result from it.
We know from experience that man sins. Hence he must have
been endowed with the power to sin. He is a finite creature. What
faculties he possesses were given him or el 3e he was endowed wigh
the power to acquire them. In either case he has the power to do
either good or evil. This power needs only the opportunity and the
occasion to express itself. There is no need of bringing in a for-
eign principle to support a sinful tendency. Thi 3 may result from
the development of habit, as will be 3hown later in the discussion
of the propagation of evil.
The belief in a primitive evil principle arises from crude
thought .Whether conceive of this principle as 3ome eternal,
personal power, or as the selfexaltation of sinless creatures, the
problem remains the same; for selfexaltation is itself an evil that
must be accounted for. We either make God the creator of this prin-
ciple or else we make evil independent and eternal, which would of
necessity involve us in a dualistic system not wholly moral.
Proceeding on the ground of our original presupposition > we
must not now lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with a
moral system. Hence it is a choice between making God the author
of eviljOr letting evil deeds and sinful wills spring from the
lives of God’s creatures. Thi 3 view demands, as we have just shown,
that God must have endowed hi 3 creatures with the power to do
.*
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either good or evil.Th^r must have the power to act, as well as
the will to do. Hence moral evil srannot be explained by freedom
alone. For how could formal freedom have asquired creative power
to contradict the divine will? Freedom opend the portal through
which sin may enterjbut there must be creative power before free-
dom affords any possibility of sinning, and there must be action
resulting from this power before the possibility can become an
actuality.
Yet God did not determine, when he endowed man with the power
to do either good or evil, what should be the nature of his acts.
Both the freedom to choose and the power to act must have been
given for a good purpose. Otherwise God wa3 not a wise , beneficent
-t e( ^ytnrt\
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creator. Hence, upon this presupposition the end proposed to hu-
manity could have been no other than to realize the harmony and
happiness of a spiritual community. We have no assurance that tl:ee
might not be a moral development of virtue, in the end practically
annihilating every form of evil for our race. Thus man would at-
tain to a state of relative perfection, a state of true liberty.
We may assume that God prefers the good for the whole race. We may
assume that he is pleased with every wise choice made by the indi
vi dual. Why , then, shoul 1 it not be consistent with hi 3 divine plan,
for mankind to always choose the right and do the right, in propor-
tion as it comes to 3ee the right and know the right? Logically
3peaking, then, there is no reason why moral evil should not be
omitted from the lives of finite individuals.
,Sfjtf
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But since man’s acts have no value when they are determined,
the Creator made him so that he could be either good or evil; and
he made conditions so that either good or bad acts were possible.
No barrier stands in man’s way; no impotence keeps him from the
free exercise of his will in doing either good or evil. By giving
man freedom , objective conditions were arranged, whereby the way
for hi 3 voluntary activity was opened; by endowing man with the
creative ability of doing either good or evil, the subjective con -
ditions were arranged that are necessary to beget action.
Whatever may be possible logically, we know from experience
that man, blessed with freedom and endowed with power, by virtue
of his own selfdirecting powSr, oftejfri performes evil deeds, where-
by he sins. This does not prove however that he never chooses the
good. It only means that God is not directly the author of moral
good or moral evil in man, and that, therefore, it is not absolutely
necessary for man to do or be one any more than the other. On the
other haul, it means that man would have been impotent to sin, but
for the power that God gave him. The origin of evil must therefore
be explained without involving us in a contradiction with those
two tenet3 .
•.
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CHAPTER VI
The Origin of Evil Will.
The question of an evil principle, eternal anl independent,
has been set aside.lt has been shown that it is contradictory
with out original presuppositionjfor no system can be called mo-
ral in which evil is considered independent.lt has also been shown
that 3uch a principle Is impossible because it involves us In a
hopeless dualism. Dualism of any kind is unsatisfactory, It always
leads to philosophical difficulties. But whenever we have a dualism
of two antagonistic forces, the problem becomes infinitely more
difficult. Two contending forces cannot long exist together with-
out serious injury to one or both. One must overcome the other, or
they will mutually destroy each other. The battle is either a bat-
tle of victory for the one and of subjection for tl e other, or it
is a battle unto death for both. If we try to avoid dualism by say
ing that evil is the product of a creative act of divine causality,
ijj becomes necessary to account for the incongruity of that crea-
tive act.
At this point many have been lead to affirm the relativity
of all evil and deny that it has any positive existence. According-
ly, all evil is creaturely limitation. Even the sins of selfconscious
individuals are not free acts of volitional persons, but the expres-
sions of a defective nature. There is no positive evil will. Gins
are the outward manifestation of an inner condition. This process
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of reasoning is very treaoherous.lt seems at first sight a plau-
sible way of escape from the implication that God directly creat-
ed the evil will. It seems preferable to deny positive evil
;
rath-
er than attribute it to a benevolent causality.
But is this the only way out of the difficulty? It seems not.
Before suggesting the way out, however, let us test a number of
current views that for one reason or other are all invalid.
If we say that Go 1 directly poduces the evil will of the
individual, we can see no good reason for saying that the Individ-
ual is free in willing even the good; since, if we admit that God
determines the evil will of the indivi lual, we cannot deny that
he determines also the goo d will,But if God determines the
good will, there can be no moral freedom. Then the individual does
not act from choice. furthermore, if man is not free to choose, but
must act as he does from his very nature, the only logical infers
ence is that he Is not free at all. Man would then be a mere au-
tomaton in the hand of an infinite creator. He would be buffeted
about, not only by circumstances in the outer world, but also by
his own conflicting emotions and impulses which God had given
him.
If evil exi&t,3 at all, and is neither co-existent with good
nor the product of a creative act of the infinite causality, It
must either have arisen of itself, and become a rival of good, or
it had its beginning in the free act of volitional, finite creat-
ures
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It could not have arisen of itself, for thej>e is no effect
without a cause. Spontaneity explains nothing. "Ex nihilo nihil
fit'.' The origin of evil, then, must be sought in man. The only ques-
tion that remains is,Ifi sin was not determined , how came man to
voluntary sin, after God had left open the way for him to do so
and had endowed him with power to act a3 a free man?
The Genesis story tells of the tempter who brought about
the downfall of man. So, too, the Manichean system teaches that
the world is created pure and perfect, b-ut was immediately defiled
by the trail of the serpent Ahriman.The latter system is avowed-
ly lualistic and hence need not be considered here. The former
gives only a partial explanation unless it makes the tempter in-
dependent and eternal. If not, whence the evil disposition of the
tempter? It must be accounted for before the origin of evil is
explained. Hence many theologians have tried to explain the origin
of evil by explaining the first sin of the tempter as selfexal-
tation. Satan was once a holy angeljhe rebelled against subordina-
tion, and from this spirit of selfexaltation sprung all the sub-
sequent sin and wickedness. The chief difficulty with this expla-
nation is that it does not go to the final beginning. We have al-
ready consiiered some objections to this explanation of the ori-
gin of moral evil. The spirit of selfexaltation and rebellion is
itself an evil. What was the origin of that? Whence came this
pri le? Whence the spirit of selfseeking and domination?
If we turn from the biblical account and the theological

interpretations based upon it, to the versions of the sceptics,
we are confronted by such views as those of Cocite and Mill, who
would have us believe that God is an imperfect workman and not
able to create an order entirely good. Evil is ever creeping in
wi^l^Lout being a part of the Creator’s purpose. According to this
view, any form of evil i3 hard to explain. There is attributed to
it a sort of independence or selfsufficiency that enables it to
exist without a cause. In the ease of moral evil, where we have a
positive ill will, our difficulties are increased. Tf moral evil
were due to a limitation on God's part, then God’s will would be
subject to the evil will of his creatures. In other words, accord-
ing to this view, man would have freedom, not because God desires
that he should be free, but becuase God would be unable to restrict
the will of his own creatures
;
if he chose to do so. God in his
impotence would merely be doing the best he could, but would not
be able to prevent evil.
According to Kant, in some of his works , at least, sin is de-
rived from man’s sensuous nature. ThGs in his "‘Praktische Vernunft"
he seems to derive evil from sense, since, he claims, it cannot be
derived from freedom nor from man’s intelligible or ideal essence,
because man ’
3
intelligible or ideal character cannot realize it-
self empirically. This of course makes evil phenomenal .Hence evil
is mere privation. Its real origin, it is true, Kant places in trans-
cendental freedom, but its phenomenal manifestation, he derives df"
from sense. ^e may a3k,Boes sin have for its object the satisfac-
..
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tion of sense? Hot in all cases, to be sure; for how could the
end of such sins as pride be the satisfaction of the senses?
Sense is that part of our nature that is capable of receiving
impressions from the outer world. It may al30 stimulate action,
but it is not an originating factor. Hence we must recall the dis-
tinction that we made between natural impulses and moral evil.
The former may find expression through the senses, but the latter
can originate only in the will of a free conscious being.
Again we are told, that evil has its origin in man’s extra-
temporal act of selffdecision.This view is calculated to relieve
the difficulty of making God the conditioning cause of the pos-
sibility of evil. But Leibnitz, the defender of this view, places
the extra-temporal existence only in the divine understanding,
the source of essencejnot in the divine will, the source of exis-
tence. Hence from his point it is illogical to speak of an extra-
temporal act of selfdecision, which could determine results in ac-
tual life. Only temporal will could do that .Moreover, if an extra-
temproal act did have an influence upon our temporal life, that
would not explain the origin of evil in the extra temporal order.
The solution would still be lacking.
Hor does it bring us any nearer the solution of our prob-
lem when we place the origin of evil in the soul’s pre-existence.
This only removes the problem farther into the past, but does not
solve it. The state of that previous existence must somehow be ac-
counted for. If evil is to be found there, its existence demands
..
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an explanation. Hence the origin of it continues to puzzle us.
To seek the source of evil in an act of humanity is a mere
figment of the mindjfoy , as we notice! in the discussion on the
nature of etfil.sin has no existence as a generality. Suffering
and sorrows are ills of individuals; sins are deeds or wilful at-
titudes of free, voluntary individuals. Stop the sinful act3 of
free conscious beings, and there will be no more sin. Banish the
individual , and moral evil will disappear with it. In this problem
of evil, the individual is the essential factor. Collective par-
ticipation does not exist apart from individual deeds.
It goes almost without saying that any mechanical system
must fail in its attempt to explain the origin of evil. Evil could
not have been produced mechanically, because a mechanical system
is itself impossible.lt could bring forth nothing. There could be
no interaction on this plane. There , in a mechanical system, could
we find the link between cause and effect? Interaction becomes
consistent and effects become intelligible only as we place be-
hind them a dynamic , void tional oausali ty.But how could we dis-
cover any such thing as an efficient cause, not to speak of a
final cause, in a mechanical system? If
,
then, a mechanical system
cannot produce changes, how could a moral consciousness awaken
under its influence?Blind nature never did develope na.ything.Only
a dynamic .personal force is able to do this. Our freedom, our power
of choice, our moral consciousness, must come from God.
Having eliminated some of the impersonal views, as impossible
let us put to the test a view that fits in with personalism. God,
..
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the infinite causality, is a personjbut ,as has already been ob-
served, he could not have directly created evil wills, wicked
deeds, and selfsih dispositions. Ginful deeds and evil wills must
\)
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originated in some other way, or have no moral significance.
The view/ which best explains the origin of evil is that which
derives it from the free act of a finite person. Evil as an ab-
stract principle, or evil as an independent reality, no longer has
any place in our system. Sin is a personal matter and must not be
traced to an:/ foreign source. Tt can have arisen only in persons.
We have noticed that the finite individual had $o be blessed with
liberty and endowed with power before he could be either good or
evil. We likewise observed that God did not determine in which way
the individual should act. The act of sinning was voluntary.lt was
the act of a free person. Nothing but a person has creative power.
It is the only truly dynamic force.lt is the only selfdirecting
unit. Hence evil could not have been originated by any but a per-
son.
We must now add that the kind of personality with which sin
originated, was both free and finite. Had the person not been free,
sin would not have been sin. This view also helps us to understand
more clearly that man was not forced to sin. We must also bear in
^ mind that the only source of moral good in the world, as well as
of moral evil, is in free, finite persons. Under any other condition,
moral good as well as moral evil, would have been impossible .But
by including free agents in his personal system, God made it mo-
'.
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ral. These free agents were finite,- finite in knowledge, finite in
power , finite in the very nature of inner perfection. But although
finite persons have only limited power, this power is nevertheless
the power of selfdirection. With this finite power of selfdirec-
tion is also coupled limited knowledge. Omnisconce cannot he
claimed for man any more than can omnipotence. If finite man were
omniscient , he would scarcely commit the folly of sinning. Sin as
we know it is irrational.lt thrives in ignorance.lt almost inva-
riably originates in ignorance.
If we say that sin originates in ignorance , the question
naturally arises, What differentiates it from error?What does
sin contain more than does error or bad conduct?We have already
pointed out that error is a mistake of the understanding while
sin is an act of the will; but that is not the only difference.
There is another difference which shows that sin can grow out
of error. When sin originates, it is little more than error. Deeds
do not become siflful until moral consciousness awakens. Just this
awakening of moral consciousness makes error, or materially bad
conduct sinful. In ignorance man is most likely to err and blun-
der.But without a consciousness of what error or bad conduct
means, there is no sin. When, however, man tastes of the tree of
knowledge
,
when his ':nder3tand'r ng unf@lds,and when a moral 3ense
of right and wrong begins to manifest itself, then man sees him-
self in entirely new relations, both to God, his creator, and to
his fellow men. This consciousness of relation places on him mo-
..
.
.
.
.
.
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ral obligations. Man is now a moral being, and all his wilfful acts,
his attti tude, his deeds, are either morally good or morally bad.
Freedom, personal power, fini tude,- these are necessary con-
ditions for the origin and existence of evil. As persons we have
freedom and power to actjaa finite persons, we are subject to
limitations that make sin easy. Thus man is permitted to sin,be-
cause he has liberty; he is able to sin
r
because he has personal
power, or creative power;man doe3 sin, because he i3 finite and
possesses only limited knowledge .Hence, sin in the beginning could
have originated only through misdirected impulses. At first it
was energy applied to an undesirable end, brought on through ig-
norance and imperfection.
But when man has acquired intelligence enough to be called
moral, he soon learns to distinguish between right and wrong. The
development of this moral sense is due very largely to revelation
and training, but only partially to experience. The first moral
creatures, of course, did not have teachers from whom to receive
training. Hence they had to learn largely by experience , and only
incidentally from training, which they mutually gave to one anoth-
er. The process was slower, but just as effective. As experience
broadened , man ' s knowledge and moral sense grew and became a cri-
terion by which he judged his own deeds. God had made man for
truth; hence, as soon a 3 he attained the capacity to comprehend
turth,his moral sense became strengthened, so that he could deal
with truth. The deeds of a moral person are not only materially
-1
good or materially bad; they take on a moral significance in the
3ame proportion as man’s knowledge and moral consciousness broad-
en.
So much for the origin of evil. Why man does not always de-
sist from evil deeds and overcome hi 3 evil will when he learns
that they are wrong morally, will be further discussed in the
next chapter on the propagation of evil.

CHAPTER VII
The Propagation of Evil.
After the evil will originated in the life of an individual,
it could not continue, unless strengthened and supported by some
influence .This influence must be more than a general principle.
We have seen that there is no abstract sin. Ho evil principle
lies at the root of the world ’
3
sin. But sinful deeds are very
real to experience. Sinful lives are seen all about us. The influ-
ence of evil wills and evil deeds are felt on every hand.Bad mo-
rals are corrupting the manners of each succeeding generation. We
are aware of the shortcomings in our own lives. We discover ten-
dencies in our disposition that our better judgment condemns. All
this is very real. It is not a vague, abstract something that ever
evades us. It is sin, felt in the human heart and acted out in
life. This is more than a principle;it is actual sinning.lt does
not exist apart from the person sinning.lt 1 3 the result of his
choice and activity. We cannot even 3ay that it exists in a gener-
ic sense, for unless it manifests itself in an evil deed or in the
ill will of an individual , i t has not moral content .There can be
weakness or imperfection in man’s nature. This may be due to ori-
ginal privation, or it may result from previous sinjbut unless in-
dividuals are consciously and voluntarily governed by these low
tendencies in their natures, Itheir lives cannot properly be called
sinful.
A sinful life i3 one that embraces an attitude of will or a
..
.
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purpose to be in some particular less th^an the sober judgment
pronounces good. This willingness on part of the individual to be
less than the best, is a positive act involving a voluntary choice.
It is a decision in favor of the worse in presence of a better.
With every such decision the tendency to yield to the lower be-
comes more likely, because the power of resisting an upward striv-
ing grows weaker.
Hence, 3in not only maintains itself as something real in
the life of a sinnerjit also has a tendency to grow. Where in-
stinctive impulses have not been properly guarded or directed,
where the habit of wrongdoing has been formed, the disposition to
do a certain thing becomes more pronounced and the deeds occur
more frequently . This can be explained by the formation of indi-
vidual habits which through frequent regula r repitition result
in spontaneity, and sometimes, in a strong tendency, which requires
more than ordinary resistance to be counteracted. This makes it
possible for sin to be propagated in the life of an individual,
even after that individual is aware of the sinfulness of his deed.
A more difficult problem presents itself when we consider
the growth of evil in society. Evil tends to spread by influencing
other lives.lt is at this point that we are in danger of falling
back into the pit of conceiving an abstract principle. To use the
figure, so frequently employed by Dr.Bowse, " The monster we just
put out of the door is now threatening to come back in at the
window." A little reflection will show, however, that an abstract
.•
.
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principle cannot be at work in society any more than it can in
the individual ; for society has no existence apart from the indi-
viduals that comprise it.
How
>
then,is sin propagated in the social world? The idea of
original sin handed down to us through heredity is contrary to
our notion of sin. Sin would not be sin if it were thtis imputed.
Sin through an act of humanity, we also notice, can mean nothing.
But sin as it exists in the lives of individuals , tends to pro-
duce imperfect conditions. Unsuitable environment is the result.
Moreover, when sin becomes a habit or a strong tendency in one in-
dividual, it results in acts that are imitated by other individu-
als, or it manifests itself as a dynamic force of an evil will
influencing other wills. ^hen there is added to this opportunity
to imitate and this possibility of being influenced the urging of
hardened sinners, the allurements of vices that make a strong ap-
peal to the natural instincts, and often turn the impulses to evil,
we can understand how sin can propagate itself in the world. It is
not the influence of abstract sinjit is the influence of one per-
son’s life on the life of another, through an evil personality and
sinful deeds. Here, as in every other case, the only dynamic force
lies in a personality and the deeds wrought by that personality.
Sin is not propagated per se;it must appear in terms of life^and
must be manifested and propagated through positive ill will and
evil deeds-
’.
.
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CONCLUSION.
From our consideration of the nature and the origin of evil,
it appears that the presence of evil does not in any way make a
moral system impossible. We may wonder why God did not make us
with natures like his own, creatures possessing all knowledge and
all power. We may even ask why God created the world at alljbut
those are not pertinent questions here. facing the conditions as
we ^ind them, what explanation of evil can we offer?IIow can we
make room for moral evil without destroying the moral character
of our system?
Let us recall the fact that there had to be freedom and
personal power. Evil could not have originated without them. But
is it not equally true that the very moral foundation of our
system would have been impossible without them? Freedom and per-
sonal power would not have been found in an impersonal system.
Hence in such a system we could have neither moral good nor moral
evil. It is not surprising therefor^ ,but on the contrary
,
quite
natural, that we should have freedom and personal power in a per-
sonal system.But with them we have also the possibility of moral
evil.
It does not follow from this that all evil is determined.
Moral evil, by its very nature, cannot be determined. If it depends
upon freedom it must be contingent .In the strict sense of the
word then, moral evil is not logically necessary.
We may also ask the question, Were imperfection and ignorance

necessary? Here the answer cannot be an emphatic no. But could not
God create moral beings without imperfections?Let us answer by
asking another question. Could he do it and remain consistent? It
has been pointed out elsewhere in this paper that God cannot
be limited by objective laws and powers; but that he is governed
by his own subjective nature. His limitations are selfimposed be-
cause he does not choose to contradict himself.Furthermore, since
God lacks the motive to do anything less than that V7hich is per-
fect, we must infer that he does only what is in harmony with his
nature.
We must now consider the question, Would it have been consis-
tent with the divine plan, 'would it have been at all possible, to
create perfect moral beings , impeccable and absolute? Ho, for by
admitting it we admit determinism which is contrary to our con-
ception of moral obligation. God wanted moral persons. They can be
moral only by choice. Whatever positive moral good or positive mo-
ral evil a dependent creature posses, it possesses by choosing be-
tween two alternatives, and by conscious striving. Hence it is ne-
cessary for him to be in a position where striving is possible.
For an absolute being that is determined there is no occasion for
becoming less than it is, no room for striving to become more
than it is. If then, an absolute being were determined by some oth-
er power, not itsel“,it would be what it is without choice and
without striving. Hence to make room for this striving and thereby
give man an opportunity to share in the development of the moral
self, God had to make him less than absolute, or, in other words,
1.
-
.
imperfect. In short , God could not create a moral system and ne-
cessarily exclude the possibility of evil.
The presence of evil In a moral system is still better un-
derstood when we bear in mind that it may be overcome, and that
through overcoming it, the individual come3 nearer to his goal of
perfect! on .This need not be the only road that leads to perfec-
tion, since sin is not absolutely necessary for the existence of
good. We feel warranted in this conclusion for two reasons. In the
first place, if sin were absolutely necessary, it would be deter-
mined; and determined evil, we have seen, would not be sin for the
one who does it.In the next place, it is not contrary to reason,
nor wholly foerign to experience, to see men embrace the truth,,
as it Is comprehended by them, and walk in the light as it falls
into their pathway. This is not saying that man could rise above
imperfection and finitude.Man would probably go on blundering in
darkness even though he should cease to sin consciouslyjbut he
need not in defiance set his obstinate will against what his mo-
ral sense tells him to be right. 'Tor need he purposely ignore the
conviction of right and wrong in his own consciousness. Logically
there is no reason why he might not wisely and devoutly 3eek to
profit by all conditions in the natural world and follow the in-
ner light in his spiritual nature by striving after his highest
ideal and thus become morally perfect.
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